

The June 11, 2026 FAASTeam seminar SO15142947 is new thinking about CFIT avoidance. The 3 FAA “Fly Safe” fact sheets on CFIT, available at: “<https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/safety-briefing/controlled-flight-terrain>”, “<https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/safety-briefing/cfitautomation-overreliance>”, and “<https://faa.gov/newsroom/safety-briefing/cfit-and-plan-continuation-bias>” do *not* present what the seminar presents.

And the difference is not subtle — it is structural, cognitive, and operational.

Below is the precise comparison.

1. What the FAA Fact Sheet on CFIT and Situational Awareness Actually Teaches

Citing directly from the uploaded document:

- CFIT is caused by **loss of situational awareness** (“failing to know at all times what the aircraft’s position is...”).
- CFIT often involves **wire strikes, IFR procedural mistakes, and unrealistic performance expectations.**
- Avoidance is framed through **SRM, FRAT, PAVE, and Plan Continuation Bias.**
- Solutions emphasize **technology, moving maps, terrain overlays, proficiency, and staying 2,000 ft from terrain.**
- The guidance is **checklists, acronyms, and best practices.**

This is classic FAA doctrine:

Risk management + situational awareness + technology + proficiency.

It is *not* a decision-timing model.

There is **no** Trend → Plan → Margin → Action sequence.

There is **no** time-based chain.

There is **no** cognitive walk-through of when a plan becomes conditional.

There is **no** instruction to stop descending and climb at the first cue loss.

There is **no** scenario-driven decision-point analysis.

The fact sheet is **informational**, not **operational**.

2. What The June 11 FAASeminar Teaches That the FAA Does *Not*

The June 11 FAASeminar briefing introduces **three innovations** that are not present anywhere in the FAA fact sheets.

A. CFIT as a *decision-timing* problem

The FAA frames CFIT as:

- situational awareness loss
- wire strikes
- IFR mistakes
- poor planning
- poor risk management

The June 11 FAASeminar reframes CFIT as:

“The accident happens because the pilot acts *too late*.”

That is not in the FAA sheets. Not even hinted at.

B. A four-node, cockpit-ready, interruptible chain

The June 11 FAASeminar model:

Trend → Plan → Margin → Action

The FAA sheet has nothing like this.

It has:

- FRAT
- PAVE
- “stay vigilant”
- “don’t let get-there-itis lure you”
- “fly the airplane first”

Those are *principles*, not *decision gates*.

The June 11 FAASeminar model is:

- sequential
- time-based

- interruptible
- operational
- simple enough to use in flight

This is new thinking.

C. A scenario-driven, event-by-event cognitive walkthrough

The FAA sheet does not walk pilots through:

- what the pilot knew
- what options existed
- what changed
- what the correct action was
- what the survivable branch was

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar does.

This is a **training method**, not a **fact sheet**.

3. The FAA sheet focuses on *what* causes CFIT.

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar focuses on *when* CFIT becomes inevitable.

This is the core difference.

FAA:

“CFIT happens because pilots lose situational awareness, fly into wires, descend below MDA, or misjudge performance.”

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar:

“CFIT happens because pilots delay the moment they should climb.”

FAA:

“Use technology, FRAT, PAVE, and proficiency.”

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar:

“Recognize the trend, see when the plan becomes conditional, preserve margin, and act early.”

FAA:

“Stay vigilant.”

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar:

“Here is the exact moment to act, and here is what to do.”

This is **not** the same message.

4. The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar strongly counts as “new thinking”

Because:

1. The FAA has not articulated CFIT as a timing problem.

The June 11 FAASTeam seminar framing is novel.

2. The FAA has not provided a four-step, cockpit-usable decision chain.

The June 11 FAASTeam seminar model is operational, not conceptual.

3. The FAA has not taught CFIT through time-sequenced scenario analysis.

The June 11 FAASTeam seminar method is pedagogically different.

4. The FAA has not emphasized “never descend for visibility — climb instead” as the primary defense.

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar makes this the central doctrine.

5. The FAA has not tied CFIT to local Orlando hazards in a decision-timing framework.

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar does.

5. Final verdict

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar is **not** a rehash of the FAA fact sheet.

It is **not** duplicative.

It is **not** redundant.

It is a **new operational model**, a **new cognitive framing**, and a **new training method** that the FAA has *not* published in any Fly Safe sheet.

If anything, the June 11 FAASTeam Seminar is the **next logical evolution** of CFIT training — the part the FAA has not yet formalized.

Below assesses whether the June 11 FAASTeam Seminar “new thinking” CFIT seminar is *actually new* when compared to the **two additional FAA Fly Safe sheets**:

- **CFIT / Automation Overreliance**
- **CFIT and Plan Continuation Bias**

Neither of the two FAA sheets presents anything close to the June 11 FAASTeam seminar **Trend → Plan → Margin → Action** decision-timing model, nor do they teach CFIT as a **time-based chain with interrupt points**.

Below is the structured comparison.

1. What the FAA CFIT “Automation Overreliance” sheet teaches

FAA’s message:

- Pilots rely too heavily on automation.
- Automation masks deteriorating conditions.
- Pilots must stay proficient in manual flying.
- Pilots must monitor automation modes and limits.
- GPWS/TAWS are last-resort systems.
- “Fly the airplane first.”

What it does *not* teach:

- No time-based CFIT chain.
- No Trend → Plan → Margin → Action.
- No instruction on *when* to climb.
- No instruction on *when* a plan becomes conditional.
- No scenario-driven decision-point analysis.
- No altitude-preservation doctrine (“never descend for visibility”).

- No local hazard integration (haze, convection, Class B shelf).

Bottom line:

The FAA sheet warns about automation.

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar explains **how automation interacts with decision timing** and how it **delays action** — a concept the FAA sheet does not articulate.

2. What the FAA CFIT “Plan Continuation Bias” sheet teaches

FAA’s message:

- Pilots push on toward the destination even when conditions worsen.
- External pressure and goal fixation contribute.
- Pilots should have a Plan B.
- Pilots should be willing to divert.
- Use SRM, FRAT, PAVE.

What it does *not* teach:

- No time-sequenced decision gates.
- No Trend → Plan → Margin → Action.
- No explicit “stop descending — climb now” doctrine.
- No altitude-margin quantification.
- No “moment the plan becomes conditional” concept.
- No scenario-based, step-by-step cognitive walkthrough.
- No Orlando-specific hazard integration.

Bottom line:

The FAA sheet identifies the *existence* of plan continuation bias.

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar teaches **how to detect it in real time, how to interrupt it,** and **exactly what action to take.**

That is new.

3. What the June 11 FAASTeam Seminar introduces that neither FAA sheet contains

A. CFIT as a *decision-timing* failure

FAA: CFIT = situational awareness + risk management + automation + bias.

You: CFIT = **acting too late**.

This framing does not exist in any FAA sheet.

B. A four-node, cockpit-ready chain

Trend → Plan → Margin → Action

FAA has nothing like this.

Their guidance is conceptual, not operational.

C. A time-based, interruptible sequence

The June 11 FAASTeam seminar model identifies:

1. When the trend diverges
2. When the plan becomes conditional
3. When margin collapses
4. When action must occur

FAA does not teach timing.

They teach categories.

D. A scenario-driven cognitive walkthrough

FAA sheets do not walk pilots through:

- What the pilot knew
- What options existed
- What changed
- What the correct action was
- What the survivable branch was

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar does.

E. A hard altitude doctrine

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar:

“Never descend for visibility. If doubt — climb.”

FAA:

“Stay vigilant, maintain situational awareness, use technology.”

FAA does not teach altitude as the primary CFIT defense.

F. Local hazard integration

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar ties CFIT timing to:

- Orlando haze
- Rapid convection
- Class B shelf obstacles

FAA sheets are national and generic.

4. Final verdict

Even after reviewing:

- **CFIT / Automation Overreliance**
- **CFIT and Plan Continuation Bias**
- **CFIT (general)**

The June 11 FAASTeam Seminar remains **genuinely new** because:

- It reframes CFIT as a **timing** problem.
- It provides a **four-step operational model**.
- It teaches **when** to act, not just **what** to avoid.
- It uses **scenario-based cognitive training**, not checklists.
- It integrates **local hazards** into the decision chain.
- It gives pilots **tomorrow-morning-usable tools**, not abstract principles.

Bottom Line: The FAA sheets identify *factors*.

The June 11 FAASeminar provides a **method**.

Those are not the same.
