

CFIT Precursors and Defences

Precursor Identification and Analysis

The traditional role of accident prevention has been to analyse [accidents](#) and [serious incidents](#) in order to determine their causal factors, and then to create defences with the aim of preventing recurrence. This fundamentally reactive approach takes no account of lesser events that have not – so far – had serious consequences.

Modern accident prevention strategies also take into account the circumstances which gave rise to these lesser events if it appears that a more severe outcome could have followed in only slightly different circumstances. This process is able to increase the body of precursors - events or factors - which can inform better accident prevention.

The process of identifying precursors should make use of safety data from [any available safety reporting or monitoring scheme](#), such as:

- Feedback from training (especially simulator) sessions;
- [Pilots' reports](#);
- [Flight data analysis](#);
- Line observations (e.g. [Line Operations Safety Audit](#))

Article Information

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Clearly, the sharing of [lessons learned](#) between operators, manufacturers and others is also important. This was the driving force behind the [Global Aviation Safety Network \(GAIN\) initiative](#). Although this project has not been active for ten years or more, Reports of the various GAIN working groups are available at [GAIN's webpage](#) and some contain still-relevant content.

The IATA Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis & Data Exchange System ([STEADDES](#)), which has the world's largest database of de-identified narrative safety reports, provides its members (and others on payment of fees) with a means to access analysis based on this database. Such analyses can help various stakeholders in aviation safety develop safety management strategies.

Precursors of CFIT Events

Examples of [CFIT](#) precursors that have been identified are listed below. By definition, this list cannot be exhaustive and continuous efforts must be made to identify other precursors.

CFIT Precursors - Occurrences

- [GPWS/TAWS](#) alert/warning (genuine, nuisance or false)
- [MSAW](#) warning
- Other cases of reduced terrain separation
- [Prolonged loss of communication](#) (PLOC) between pilot and controller(s)
- Low-energy state during approach
- Land short (runway undershoot) event
- Low altitude pattern following a [go-around](#)
- Inappropriate low altitude manoeuvring
- Low-on-fuel condition/[fuel starvation](#)

CFIT Precursors - Deviations (Procedural/Flight Path)

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- Descent/flight below [segment or sector safe altitude](#)
- [Altimeter setting error](#)
- Failure to check navigation accuracy before approach
- Lateral deviation during approach ([STAR](#))
- Failure to revert to [navaids](#) raw data in case of doubts on automation
- Incorrect or inappropriate [radar vectoring](#) by ATC (i.e., below [minimum vectoring altitude \(MVA\)](#) and/or toward high terrain)
- Premature descent to the next step-down altitude during a multiple-steps-down [non-precision approach](#)
- [DME](#) confusion (non-collocated DME versus [ILS](#)-DME), in identifying the final descent point
- Premature descent to [DA\(H\)](#) before G/S intercept or premature descent to [MDA\(H\)](#) before final descent-point/[FAF](#)
- Premature descent below MDA(H) before reaching the visual descent-point (VDP)
- Flight below desired flight path during initial and/or final approach
- Continued approach, when below DA(H) or MDA(H), after loss of [visual references](#)
- Late or inadequate response to GPWS/TAWS alert/warning
- Late or inadequate response to [MSAW](#) warning
- Late or inadequate response to [windshear warning](#)
- [Unstabilized approach](#) (steep or shallow approach)
- Failure to [go-around](#)
- Lack of effective flight path control during go-around
- Failure to follow published [missed-approach](#) procedure
- Inadequate fuel management

CFIT Defences and Controls

Identification of accident precursors is only half the battle; it is also necessary to define and implement defences and control strategies to address the threats involved

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- Industry prevention strategies and best practices (See also Further Reading)
- Adherence to [SOPs](#) (task sharing, briefings, use of [checklists](#), [standard calls](#) and excessive-deviation callouts, [mutual crosscheck](#) and backup)
- Cross-check of takeoff data: [mass and balance](#), fuel distribution, wind component, runway conditions, flaps setting, V_1/V_r speeds, etc.
- Adherence to [sterile-cockpit](#) rule
- Adopting the [constant-angle non-precision approach](#) (CANPA)/constant descent final-approach (CDFA) concept
- Use of an aircraft/airport-specific Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID) in case of engine failure
- Adequate use and supervision of automation
- Vertical and horizontal flight paths monitoring ([situational and energy awareness](#))
- Altimeter setting cross-check
- Cross-checking cleared altitude versus [minimum safe altitude](#)
- Timely and adequate response to [GPWS/TAWS](#) alert or warning
- Timely and adequate response to [MSAW](#) warning
- Timely and adequate response to [windshear alert or warning](#)
- Awareness of [minimum vectoring altitudes](#)
- Awareness of approach design criteria ([PANS-OPS versus TERPS](#))
- Awareness of relationship between track distance to runway threshold and height (300 ft/nm rule-of-thumb)
- Awareness of [low-OAT correction](#) to be added to minimum approach altitudes/heights
- Awareness of minimum safe radio-altimeter readings for each approach segment (IAF-IF, IF-FAF)
- Awareness of "black-hole" or other [visual illusions](#) for

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display, [head-up display](#), [enhanced-vision](#), etc.)

Further Reading

Industry Prevention Strategies and Best Practice Risk

factors (threats) observed in CFIT events as well as recommended prevention strategies and best practices are identified in the following documents:

- FAA/Industry – CFIT Education and Training Aid:
 - CFIT Checklist – Evaluate the Risk and Take Action.
- [Flight Safety Foundation – ALAR Toolkit](#):
 - ALAR Risk Awareness Tool (RAT);
 - ALAR Risk Reduction Guide (RRG); and,
 - ALAR Briefing Notes.
- Flight Safety Foundation [CFIT Education and Training Aid](#);
- Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Notes – Operating Environment section:
 - [Enhancing Terrain Awareness](#)

About Accident and Incident Precursors The role of accident and incident precursor identification and analysis is well described in the [presentation](#) and [supporting article](#) presented to the 2010 Flight Safety Foundation European Aviation Safety Seminar by Michel Tremaud. The article lists identified precursors and defences/controls for a range of different accident and incident types.

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